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Key Points 
Negative rates have invalidated the normal business model of central banks, which 
consists of issuing zero-interest bearing cash as liabilities and earning a return on their 
assets (the resulting profits are called “seigniorage”). But many central banks are now 
earning a negative rate on their assets. Seigniorage, in fact, might now become negative 
in the euro area and in Japan. 
Bond purchasing programmes (called usually QE for quantitative easing) offer central 
banks at least temporary profit opportunities since they can issue liabilities at lower rates 
than the long-term bonds they acquire. The resulting profits should be regarded in the 
same way as those of investment banks. For the time being, central banks are making 
large profits on their investment banking activities, but little in terms of traditional 
seigniorage. 
The QE programme of the European Central Bank does not increase its seigniorage 
revenues, because 80% of the euro area’s sovereign bond purchase programme is done 
by the national central banks on their own accounts.  
Policy Implication 
The seigniorage income of the ECB will be much smaller than many assume.  One should 
thus not count on it as a source for any euro-area projects. 
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he business of central banks used to be 
simple and profitable: they issued cash 
and were free to invest the proceeds in the 
assets they liked. The more cash they issued, the 
more they used to gain. But negative rates have 
upended this business model. Printing bank 
notes when interest rates go negative becomes a 
loss-making business. 
In economics text books, seigniorage is defined as 
the profits a central bank makes when it issues 
cash and invests the proceeds in assets that yield 
interest. The public has to hold cash because it is 
legal tender. Seigniorage1 can thus be understood 
as the revenue from the monopoly of issuing 
legal tender. Seigniorage revenues used to be 
important, up to 0.5% of GDP, enough to 
influence important decisions.2 
Central banks can also force banks to hold 
reserves (so-called required reserves) without 
paying interest on them. These reserves are part 
of the monetary base and thus contribute 
potentially to seigniorage income. However, 
most central banks have abandoned this practice 
and decided to remunerate required reserve 
holdings. Negative rates have also put this model 
upside down: banks are happy for any reserves 
they can park at the central bank without having 
to pay for the privilege.  
Economists thus define seigniorage as the 
product of the amount of cash outstanding times 
‘the’ interest rate. What is the relevant interest 
rate depends, in practice, on the type of assets the 
central banks holds as counterpart to the issuance 
of cash. 
The Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan 
usually invest in government securities of 
various maturities. In Japan the yields on 
government bonds up to 10 years are now 
negative, which implies that normal calculations 
on seigniorage should show a loss this year. 
The euro are is different in that, until it started 
using ‘unconventional’ policy tools, the assets of 
                                                   
1 This is the rather feudal word still used nowadays to 
refer to the income of central banks, because that 
income is derived from the right to issue money, 
which was once the prerogative of medieval lords 
(http://www.nbbmuseum.be/doc/infosheets/fiche
_information_EN_15.pdf). 
the eurosystem were mainly loans to commercial 
banks. The seigniorage, or monetary income to be 
distributed among the NCBs thus used to be 
(roughly) equal to cash in circulation multiplied 
with the euro area wide interest rate for lending 
operation set the ECB times. The ECB’s lending 
rate has already been close to zero for some time 
(0.05 % since September 2014) but was set exactly 
to zero only in March of this year, which should 
lead to zero seigniorage revenues.  
The deposit rate, i.e. the interest on (excess) 
reserves, has already been negative since June of 
2014. Formally this rate should be irrelevant for 
seigniorage calculations since there is no 
obligation of banks to deposit money at the ECB 
(aside from a very small required reserve ratio).  
Recently, the ECB has announced a new tool, the 
so-called ‘targeted long term refinancing 
operations’ (TLTRO), under which it will charge 
banks the deposit rate if they expand lending 
above a certain, not very demanding, benchmark. 
Since banks are expected to transfer most of their 
borrowing from the ECB towards this facility and 
given that the deposit rate now stands a minus 40 
basis points, the theoretical seigniorage revenues 
for the ECB might well turn negative this year.  
Negative rates have another implication: The 
usual calculations of the ‘net worth’ of central 
banks become meaningless. A number of recent 
policy proposals (Siebert (2012), Vihriälä & 
Weder di Mauro (2014) or High Level Group on 
EU Finances (2015)) are based on a reliable 
stream of ECB profits, implying that the present 
value of the future seigniorage revenues of the 
ECB is rather high. All these calculations, most 
prominently Buiter (2008), are based on a stream 
of future seigniorage revenues discounted back 
to the present. 
But with negative rates the future is no longer 
‘discounted’. On the contrary, future revenues 
are worth more than revenues today. But an 
infinite sum of ever larger negative revenues is 
2 See Gros & Vandille (1995) and Gros (2004), who 
examine the distribution of the European Central 
Bank’s seigniorage revenue and the prospective gains 
accruing to the new member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
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meaningless. Moreover, negative rates increase 
the demand for cash. This implies that in future 
central banks might have to pay ever more for the 
privilege to issue legal tender. 
In the euro area the cash to GDP ratio has already 
risen to 10 %. In Japan, with its long history of 
zero rates, that ratio has gone to 16 %. If negative 
rates persist there is thus a danger that central 
banks will make ever larger losses as more and 
more institutes use vaults to stash liquidity in 
cash instead of paying the ECB, or the German 
government, for safekeeping it. The cost of 
storing and insuring large amounts of cash is 
reportedly only 30 basis points (per annum). As 
long as the deposit rate at the ECB is below this 
threshold one should thus expect the demand for 
cash to increase. 
Central banks as investment bankers 
The theoretical seigniorage revenues should thus 
disappear, and even become ever more negative 
with negative rates. But in reality central bank 
profits are holding up rather well. The reason is 
that as their traditional business model is 
destroyed by negative rates, central banks have 
gone in another business, namely maturity 
transformation of the kind usually done by 
investment banks. Central banks have started to 
leverage up their balance sheet; buying large 
amounts of long term governments (financed by 
short term deposits). This is called ‘quantitative 
easing’. The purpose is to force long term interest 
rates down.  
QE in general increases the income of a central 
bank, especially if earns on both sides: on its 
liabilities it charges a fee on the deposits of 
commercial banks and on its asset side it earns, 
or rather used to earn, a return on long term 
government bonds. With German long term rates 
negative the Bundesbank loses on its 
investments, but the 10 year rate is still higher 
than the deposit rate. 
One should thus split the balance sheet of a 
central bank in two conceptually very different 
parts:  
1) the issuing department (which issues legal 
tender) and  
2) the investment banking department, which 
issues short term deposits to buy longer-term 
and/or more risky assets, which usually yield 
much more than a central bank has to pay on its 
short-term debt. 
The revenues (= profits since there are no costs, 
except the printing of bank notes) of the issuing 
department correspond to theoretical 
seigniorage: 'the' interest rates multiplied by cash 
in circulation. (Required reserves on which 
interest is paid net out of the calculation.)  
The profits of the investment banking 
department are equal to the difference what the 
central bank pays in its liabilities (short term 
deposits of commercial banks) and what it earns 
on the securities it has invested in. The profits of 
the investment banking department are not 
certain. If the short term refinancing costs 
increase losses can arise quickly. 
Following central bank revenues in the 
euro area 
One has to be careful in looking for seigniorage 
and the investment banking profits in the case of 
the ECB. The euro area is a special case in central 
banking accounting.  
There exists a complicated system of calculating 
and distributing the profits from central bank 
activities in the euro area. The ECB is the place 
where all decisions are taken, but not the place 
where most profits arise. The ECB is a legal 
entity, separate from the NCBs, with which 
together it forms the ‘eurosystem’. The NCBs 
actually implement most monetary policy 
operations, i.e. they are the legal counterparts for 
banks when they borrow ‘from the ECB’ or when 
‘the ECB’ buys government bonds. For ‘normal’ 
monetary policy operations this does not matter. 
All income (occasionally losses, when a bank fails 
and its collateral proves insufficient) is added up 
to calculate what is called the (euro-area wide) 
‘monetary income’. This sum is then distributed 
among the NCB pro rata their capital shares. The 
ECB proper usually gets a small cut from the 
total. But in general this does not matter since the 
NCB in turns own the capital of the ECB in the 
same proportions. 
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The revenues of the issuing department 
correspond roughly to what the eurosystem calls 
'monetary income', which is then distributed to 
the NCBs (and then to their respective 
governments). With negative rates one gets of 
course negative seigniorage if one just multiplies 
base money with 'the' interest rate. 
Table 1 below shows a schematic split of the 
balance sheet of the eurosystem. Identification of 
the investment banking activities is made next to 
impossible by the fact that the NCB still execute 
many national functions which transit through 
their balance sheets, but have nothing to do with 
monetary policy. The table below is based on the 
available data for the only two items on the 
consolidated balance sheet of the eurosystem 
which are clearly identified as being related to 
monetary policy. 
Table 1. Profit centres in euro area central banking 
 Assets ‘earmarked’ Nature of 
liabilities 
Size for 
Eurosystem 
(€bn) end 2015 
Profit/loss projection for 
eurosystem in 2016 (€bn) 
Issuing department  Lending to banks Monetary Base 
(cash) 
1080 -2 – -4 (loss) 
Investment banking 
department 
Securities 
(commercial paper, 
sovereign bonds, 
etc.) 
(short term) 
deposits 
(=‘excess 
reserves’) 
800 +8 on SMP holdings and 
negative deposit rate 
‘Dead wood’ not 
related to monetary 
policy  
Various (securities, 
ANFA) 
Various +/- 900 Not contained in the 
monetary income. 
Total balance sheet   2.780 +/- 5  
Source: Own calculations based on ECB data. 
Figure 1 on the following page shows the 
evolution of the two profit centres of the 
eurosystem over time. It is apparent that during 
‘normal’ times the issuing department 
dominates. The relative proportions change 
radically when the ECB starts to adopt 
unconventional measures and (recorded) 
investment banking profits soared when the ECB 
started to buy bonds in 2011-12.  
The investment banking department is now the 
real profit centre in the euro area (as elsewhere in 
countries at, or close to the zero lower bound). In 
2015, the revenues of the issuing department of 
the eurosystem were only €500 million, which 
would not even cover the operating costs of the 
ECB in Frankfurt, which amounted to over €600 
million (The total operating costs of the entire 
eurosystem – ECB plus NCBs – amount to over 
€2 billion).  
One has to keep in mind that the official 
monetary income calculations are misleading. 
The eurosystem booked a particularly large 
profit on its bond holdings in 2012. This was the 
year government of Greece defaulted on its 
bonds in an operation euphemistically called 
‘Private Sector Involvement’. The ECB had 
bought about €60 billion of Greek bonds, but 
miraculously did not make any loss on them 
because it had previously ‘agreed’ with the Greek 
government that all the bonds held by the 
eurosystem (i.e. the NCBs) were exchanged with 
other bonds with identical financial conditions, 
but bearing a different identification number. In 
the PSI operation all bond series where subject to 
an ‘offer’ of a large haircut. Only the bond series 
held by the ECB were exempted from the haircut.  
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Figure 1. ECB – eurosystem income (€ bn) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ECB data. 
 
The ECB had bought the bonds on the secondary 
market as any other market participants. But 
everybody else had to take a haircut of almost 80 
%, only the ECB was made whole. It is thus clear 
that under normal circumstances the euro system 
would have made a very large loss (about €25 
billion) if the euro area governments had not 
somehow ‘persuaded’ the Greek government not 
to default on the ECB.  
Another little known ‘side agreement’ later 
stipulated that the profits the eurosystem earned 
by buying Greek bonds at a low market price 
(often below 70% of face value) and getting later 
repaid the full face value should be returned to 
the Greek government. This is achieved 
indirectly, via the NCBs, which transfer their 
shares of the overall monetary income to their 
respective governments, which are then 
supposed to transfer to the Greek government 
the sum corresponding to the difference between 
the purchase price and the face value. A large 
part of the profits recorded in the eurosystem 
over the last years thus went back to Greece.  
The ECB is widely believed to have bought about 
€60 billion of Greek government bonds at a 
market value of perhaps €38 billion. This means 
that about €22 billion (the difference between 
market and face value) of the profits of the 
investment banking department of the 
eurosystem are only apparent and will in reality 
be channelled to Greece. 
Another part of the investment banking profits of 
the eurosystem derives from the purchases of 
other government bonds under the SMP, which 
was done under full risk sharing. Until late 2012 
these purchase amounted to almost €200 billion 
of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese bonds. These 
bonds have all risen strongly in value, often 
above par thus increasing the ‘monetary income’ 
calculations. But the ECB holdings are now only 
around €110 billion. 
The ECB’s balance sheet is now increasing again. 
The investment banking profits should increase 
again. However, with 80% of QE being 
undertaken by the NCB for their own account, 
the ECB had to redefine its monetary income. A 
recent decision of the ECB determines that the 
national bonds bought by the NCBs under the 
PSPP will be ‘deemed to have an income’ equal 
to the lending rate, i.e. zero. A large part of the 
future investment banking income will thus 
accrue to NCBs directly and will not be 
distributed within the eurosystem. The amount 
of seigniorage one can expect for the eurosystem 
in future has thus become somewhat variable 
and might much lower than most people think. 
Experience has shown that investment banking is 
an inherently unstable business. One should thus 
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be careful with proposals under which the 
seigniorage of the ECB is used as reliable source 
of income. 
The old business model of issuing euro cash has 
become unprofitable. But in the near future the 
bond buying will at least lead to some more 
revenues going through the eurosystem because 
the ‘income’ from the negative interest on the 
liabilities created by the PSPP will still be pooled. 
ECB has thus effectively turned the old business 
model of central banks around: today it earns a 
stream of income on its liabilities, while the 
returns of an increasing part of its assets go to the 
NCBs. This cannot be a stable arrangement. 
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